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THE RETURN OF GREAT-POWER COMPETITION
Cold War Lessons about Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and
Defense of Sea Lines of Communication
Bradford Dismukes

Great-power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of
U.S. national security.

T

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES N. MATTIS, 19 JANUARY 2018

hese words of Secretary Mattis are momentous.1 Great-power competition
is recognized widely as having been the root cause of the First World War, a
powerful contributor to the Second World War, and a core element of the Cold
War.2 Mr. Mattis raises the serious possibility that war with a major opponent lies
on the horizon. Such a war might be fought for major, even existential, stakes; but
smaller, indecisive wars among the great powers also could occur, as was the case
during earlier centuries in Europe.3
An immediate, tangible expression of the new orientation was the reestablishment of the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet. When Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Admiral John M. Richardson made the announcement in May 2018, he justified
the need for the fleet as a response to great-power competition, specifically with
Russia.4 The fleet’s area of responsibility (AOR) centers on the North Atlantic
Ocean, whose Cold War lessons from history include the importance of strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and defense of sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). These would have constituted two of the original Second Fleet’s three
principal strategic missions had there been a war with the Soviet Union.5 Strategic
ASW meant attacking Soviet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) to affect the
superpower nuclear balance; defending SLOCs is a particular form of sea control,
defined as being able to use the sea when, where, and for the purposes desired. In
this case, defending SLOCs meant protecting shipping between North America
and Europe—where unimpeded passage was a sine qua non for the Western
alliance to succeed in war at the conventional level. Strategic ASW arrived on
the scene in the mid-1980s; SLOC defense long had been a fixture of U.S. naval
strategy, born of the searing experience of two world wars and from geostrategic
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theories dating at least from the first half of the twentieth century.6 SLOC defense
has been the most enduring single construct in the Navy’s strategic thinking,
always in the back of the planner’s mind—a kind of default position; as will be
seen, even strategic ASW was put to its service.
The immediate aim of this article is to contribute to the historical understanding of intelligence and planning during the Cold War. The larger aim
is to draw lessons that may be useful for Navy planning in the new world of
great-power competition. (Readers whose main interest is less in the history
of the Cold War are invited to fast-forward to the sections following “Lessons
for Today.”)
The Cold War is viewed, properly, as a historic success. Yet, paradoxically, several of the lessons drawn from the Navy’s experience during it are negative ones—
namely, what to avoid. That is because Cold War planning for both strategic ASW
and SLOC defense experienced important failures, first in strategic intelligence,
then in the way planners used that intelligence. Intelligence errors centered on
varying levels of success in understanding Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly,
in the case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case of strategic ASW. Planning errors
involved a failure to draw a bright line between the adversary that intelligence
identified, as realistically as possible, and the one the planner contrived to fight.
Planners carry multiple responsibilities—not all of which are related to the adversary. The first is to defend their own vulnerabilities, regardless of the strategic
intentions imputed to the adversary. Planners also are responsible for promoting
alliance solidarity and protecting Navy interests in interservice competition for
the defense budget.7 The crucial nexus between intelligence and planning will be
examined in the concluding sections.
Any effort to understand the Navy’s Cold War history must start with these
two historically intertwined intelligence failures. In the case of strategic ASW,
the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) ultimately was correct. But well over eight
years elapsed between (1) 1973, when the Soviets assigned their SSBNs a critical
role in their war plans, and simultaneously assigned their general-purpose-force
(GPF) navy the mission of defending those SSBNs in sea bastions; and (2) the
early 1980s, when the IC properly recognized those roles. Shortly after that, Navy
planners responded with the Maritime Strategy, publicly announced in 1986.8 But
before the Maritime Strategy (i.e., between [1] and [2]), naval planning experienced approximately a decade of lost opportunity and misdirected effort.
This lengthy, if little recognized, intelligence failure was linked to a larger
one. Intelligence about the SLOCs was simply wrong. From the beginning of the
Cold War in the late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was convinced that in a
World War III the Soviets intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III.” This was
incorrect. The Soviet navy’s primary mission was not to attack on the high seas
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of the North Atlantic but to stay close to home to defend the motherland and,
after 1973, its SSBNs in maritime bastions. Students of the Cold War U.S. Navy
have known (from the work of Hattendorf and Ford and Rosenberg, published
in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century) that the top priority accorded the threat to the SLOCs was a mistake.9 But the focus of these—the
standard narratives of the period—was on the U.S. maritime strategy of 1981–86,
and much less on what came before. If anything, the striking, widely recognized
achievement that the Maritime Strategy represented served to redeem the Navy’s
previous errors, allowing an attitude of “all’s well that ends well” to prevail.
Many might ask whether attention to the earlier period really is needed. This
article answers yes, for two reasons. First, these mistakes had major, costly consequences, and you cannot learn from your mistakes by ignoring them. Second,
if it happened once, it could happen again. And in this case, “once” means again
and again over decades. When the behavior of a great institution that prides
itself on intellectual rigor cannot be explained on strictly rational grounds, we
have to ask why. To ignore this question is to risk unknowingly repeating yesterday’s errors today or in the future. This is not a criticism of the Navy’s Cold
War leaders; they had to make hard choices to deal with a steadily burgeoning
opponent, in the face of massive uncertainty—unlike the author, who has the
benefit of hindsight.
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
How did the notion that the Soviet navy’s main mission was anti-SLOC become
an idée fixe? Before 1974, there was no national intelligence estimate (NIE) on
the Soviet navy; its capabilities and intentions were what the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) said they were, with the fairly uncritical approval of the
Defense Intelligence Agency.10 For ONI, the Soviet navy, serving an aggressive
Communist ideology, was as offensively minded as its senior partner, the Soviet
army. From this perspective, an inventory at one point approaching four hundred
submarines—a far larger number than defense alone might seem to justify—
could indicate only offensive intent. Its apparent focus was the SLOCs of NATO
that connected the continents—representing a vulnerability that two world wars
had shown to be close to indefensible.
However, these inferences, while highly plausible, were essentially abstract.
Just about all the concrete evidence pointed in the opposite direction: that attacking the SLOCs was, at best, a secondary priority for Soviet planners. Uncertainty
always attaches to intelligence. (As intelligence professionals remind their consumers, “If it’s a fact, it isn’t intelligence.”) So the accounting below will identify,
where possible, the topics about which the IC was reasonably confident and those
where uncertainty prevailed.11 First we turn to individual pieces of evidence from
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standard intelligence sources, held at the time with fairly high confidence, and
then to open-source analysis of Soviet military writings, about which confidence
was low or perhaps nonexistent.
Evidence from Standard Intelligence Sources
In the early 1950s, Whiskey-class submarines dominated Soviet building programs. Norman Polmar has noted that, in the Soviet categorization of the time,
these boats were intended to provide direct, “regional” defense of the USSR. The
“oceangoing” Zulu class formed less than 10 percent of the inventory.12 Soviet
submarine designs in general were not optimized to perform the anti-SLOC
mission; many classes had only small-capacity torpedo spaces. The standard
load of conventional torpedoes for a Soviet diesel submarine was a fifty-fifty split
between ASW and anti–surface ship weapons. The submarine force did not train
to attack defended, maneuvering convoys.13 Routinely, only a small fraction of
the Soviet navy’s order of battle deployed beyond home waters. The supporting
infrastructure and logistics for distant operations were correspondingly weak.14
No exercises of significant scale with an anti-SLOC theme ever occurred in the
North Atlantic, or anywhere else.15
Anticarrier exercises, however, were a constant feature—often using U.S. carriers as training targets. These exercises were especially fraught when the Soviets
employed them during crises in the Third World—the modern-day equivalent
of training your guns on your adversary.16 An assessment of intent—indeed, of
Soviet capabilities—drawn from forces, training, operations, and exercises would
have concluded anticarrier, yes; anti-SLOC, no. (The Soviets did show great interest in ASW, but were unable to develop capabilities to detect and engage their
adversaries’ much-quieter submarines.)
Evidence from Open Sources
In the 1960s and early ’70s, analysis of Soviet public statements about military
doctrine and strategy by Herrick, MccGwire, Blechman, and others showed that
the Soviet navy was committed to defense, mainly preoccupied with protecting
the homeland and supporting the seaward flanks of the Soviet army.17 An important exception was Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovskiy’s authoritative Military Strategy; its 1962 edition added anti-SLOC efforts as an important priority. However,
the 1968 edition then downgraded that mission to being an “important” task,
relevant only in the later phases of a broken-back nuclear war.18 In general, when
the Soviets did discuss SLOCs, they focused on action not on the high seas but
against ports of debarkation, often emphasizing the efficacy of mines.
In the early 1970s, open-source analysis at the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) delivered a conclusion that further ruled out anti-SLOC intent. The Soviet
adversary now had radically new strategic priorities: SSBNs, forming a strategic
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reserve; the rest of its navy was characterized as “pro-SSBN.”19 Structured and
trained for the mission of bastion defense, the Soviet navy could not be committed at the same time to a campaign against the North Atlantic SLOCs.20
It seems nearly certain that the bastions became operational in 1973. That year
the Delta I–class SSBN, carrying the Soviet navy’s first intercontinental-range missile, the SS-N-8 Sawfly, entered service.21 For the Soviets, the SS-N-8 was a gift of
technology that brought a revolutionary new military use of the sea. The SS-N-8
(and its successors) became the foundation of the Soviet nuclear reserve.22
It seems inconceivable that the strategic-reserve/bastion-defense missions
were established any later than 1973. One would have to believe—as few familiar
with it do—that the Soviet
Intelligence errors centered on . . . understand- general staff lacked thoroughing Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly, in ness and foresight, that it inithe case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case tially ignored possible threats
to its SSBN reserve, and that
of strategic ASW.
it only later improvised a response to a U.S. ASW threat that it perceived sometime after 1973. As Perse has
shown, starting as early as 1970, statements by successive CNOs and other USN
officials had given the Soviets strong reason to believe the United States intended
to attack their SSBNs.23 In addition, the Soviets were well aware, from their dayto-day operational experience and their own human intelligence, of the acoustic
advantage that American and other Western submarines enjoyed over their own.24
Further, 1973 was exactly the time that Soviet navy chief Sergey G. Gorshkov
was “announcing” the new Soviet strategy in a series of eleven articles (1972–73)
in Morskoy sbornik, the Soviet navy’s equivalent of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.25 Expressing ideas as sweeping as those of Sir Julian S. Corbett and
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Gorshkov’s articles described a role for sea power never
before seen in the modern era. The Soviet navy had become the ultimate guarantor of the Soviet state. When a war moved to the nuclear level, as the Soviets believed likely, their navy’s missiles would be withheld from initial nuclear strikes.
They would stand as a force in being to deter (further) nuclear attacks on the
Soviet Union, deal with defeated enemies and erstwhile allies, and dictate the
terms of the postwar peace. It was a stunning message of self-importance, selfcongratulation—and defiance of the West. Gorshkov was saying, in effect: We
have our bastions. We know you are going to attack them. We will defeat you.26
Unfortunately, for many years the U.S. Navy did not get this message. It did
not recognize the existence of the bastions until 1980–81, when an extraordinary
breakthrough in special compartmented intelligence (SCI) confirmed in every
detail the validity of the conclusions that open-source analysts had been describing since 1973.27
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THE RECKONING
In the meantime, in 1974, the first NIE with an exclusive focus on the Soviet
navy concluded that the Soviets viewed anti-SLOC as a secondary priority, with
the possible exception of when a war became unexpectedly prolonged. The
NIE underlined the deep historical roots of this judgment by observing that the
anti-SLOC mission had exerted no observable influence on Soviet shipbuilding
programs.28 Because shipbuilding is a process often measured in decades, this
implies that the anti-SLOC mission never held an important priority for the
Soviets during the Cold War. This assessment would seem to be borne out by
Polmar’s observations regarding the Soviets’ categorization of their submarines
built in the 1950s.
However, the 1974 NIE was silent on the bastions/strategic-reserve missions.
Indeed, in a discussion of the variety of measures the Soviets might be taking to
protect their SSBNs, the idea of employing their GPF navy for that purpose was
simply absent. The IC remained blind to the Soviet navy’s main missions until the
SCI breakthrough of 1980–81.29
Office of Naval Intelligence
During this period, ONI fought a rearguard action, petitioning the IC to reconsider and reverse the low priority accorded the anti-SLOC mission—to no avail.
Evidence indicates that ONI continued to pursue this goal even after the (Navyderived) SCI breakthrough clearly revealed that bastion defense was the critical
mission of the GPF navy, one that no other branch of the Soviet armed forces
could carry out.30
In 1978, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–authored document—of lesser
standing than an IC-wide NIE—stated that the GPF navy had been assigned the
mission of defending SSBNs. However, it did not indicate whether this judgment
arose from new evidence or simply from a revised reading of the logic of the
situation, as seen from the Soviet vantage point.31 A second NIE, prepared in
1982, corrected the IC’s error about the strategic reserve and clearly stated the top
priority assigned to the GPF navy for its defense.32 Tellingly, nothing uncovered
in the post-Soviet period has given reason to question the accuracy of the second
NIE’s conclusions.
The question arises: Why did ONI reject the bastion/strategic-reserve concept
for so long? Indeed, why did it not investigate it as a secondary hypothesis worthy
of exploration via upgraded collection priority or concentrated analytical focus?
One possibility is that the conviction that the Soviet navy would surge forward on
D-day to attack the SLOCs ruled out contemplation of any other possible strategic role for it. Another is that ONI was affected by a totally incorrect suspicion,
often encountered within the Navy at large, that conclusions drawn from open
sources, as CNA’s were, could not be trusted, because the source materials from
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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which they were drawn were riddled with Soviet “disinformation.” Disinformation was and is a real thing (the word entered the English lexicon in the late 1940s
from the Soviet/Russian dezinformatsiya). But while use of disinformation may
have been widespread in Soviet propaganda, as it is today in Russia, disinformation never was injected into Soviet doctrinal writings.33 No information that has
come to light since the fall of the Soviet Union has suggested otherwise.
However, evaluation of factors such as these does not seem to have played an
important role in ONI’s attitude toward the bastion / strategic reserve. Rather, the
reality was more prosaic: insights that CNA and others drew from open sources
simply were ignored. In 2007, Richard L. Haver, a civilian former deputy director of ONI, looking back at events thirty years before, put it as follows: “I would
also say, and to give people their due, there were people like Bob Herrick, Brad
Dismukes, and Jamie McConnell . . . who were reading what the Russians were
saying . . . who told us for nearly fifteen years that we had it wrong. And, frankly,
the system ignored them.”34
Navy Planners
If ONI “had it wrong,” so, to a lesser degree, did Navy planners, whose senior
position always gives them the last word. Regardless of contrary conclusions
emanating from the IC, fixation with an offensive-minded, anti-SLOC enemy maintained its hold on Navy thinking. According to Hattendorf, Admiral
Thomas B. Hayward (CNO 1978–82), on first being briefed about the bastions in
August 1981, “found the concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that
he expressed disbelief that the Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such
a [defensive] manner.”35
However, once the validity of the “new” Soviet strategy was accepted, the Navy
delivered its riposte with an alacrity rare in large organizations. In January 1986,
Admiral James D. Watkins (CNO 1982–86) publicly announced the Maritime
Strategy in the Naval Institute Proceedings.36 His tightly reasoned article described
a new “war termination” mission for the Navy: by attacking the bastions and putting the strategic reserve at risk, the United States might gain strategic leverage
over the Soviets before nuclear escalation occurred. In other words, the U.S. Navy
would prevent its Soviet opponent from achieving its assigned mission, which
was nothing less than to affect the course and outcome of the war as a whole.
The Navy itself would take up that role, through achievement of command of
the (under)sea.
Attention to this extraordinary claim—that the Navy might have made a decisive contribution to the outcome of a World War III—has been muted, for at
least two reasons. First, the CNO’s article immediately drew sharp criticism from
advocates of the strategic doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), who
argued vigorously that threatening Soviet SSBNs was dangerously escalatory.37
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/6
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A second possible reason is that after announcing the war-termination mission
the article addressed the SLOCs—with a logic that is difficult to follow. On one
hand, it stated that attacking Western SLOCs would be, for the Soviets, “secondary, at least at the war’s start,”
and protecting the bastions
From the beginning of the Cold War in the
late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was was, for the Soviets, a “critical
convinced that in a World War III the Soviets . . . role.” On the other hand,
intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III.” it stated that by threatening
Soviet SSBNs the U.S. Navy
This was incorrect.
would “force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions . . . den[ying] . . . the option of a massive,
early attempt to interdict our [SLOCs].”38
In 1986, one could not force an opposing navy to play what has just been described as its critical role—the role for which much of it in fact had been created.
The notion seems particularly inapt when the mission in question was one the
Soviet navy had been executing for over a dozen years at that point. Nor does it
seem reasonable to seek to deny the adversary an “early attempt” to execute an
option described as merely “secondary” in its priorities “at the war’s start.”39
This criticism is not an idle historical “gotcha.” The idea of threatening the
reserve to force the Soviets to defend it, and thereby to protect the SLOCs, is
found even in recent references. In an April 2018 book review in Foreign Affairs, Stephen P. Rosen repeated Admiral Watkins’s formulation.40 This may be
seen today as just badly told history, but the disjointed connection between the
two strategic missions has proved enduring. Indeed, SLOC protection held sway
when the Navy’s Maritime Strategy soon was taken up at the national level. The
National Security Strategy of the United States, signed by President Ronald W.
Reagan in January 1987, did not mention war termination. Its announced intent
to threaten Soviet “submarines” was justified solely on the grounds that doing so
would “minimize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe
by sea.”41 In this way, “attack the bastions and defend the SLOCs” entered the
national discourse at the highest level. Thus did a depiction of a Soviet adversary
that posed a threat to the SLOCs march on into the late 1980s—fifteen years after
the IC had concluded that such a use of the Soviet navy was unlikely.
An anti-SLOC Soviet adversary may not have comported with reality—but it
did fit other needs of Navy planners to a T. As noted previously, prudence dictates that planners defend their own vulnerabilities. In the abstract—and in the
popular mind of Americans at large—the United States had no greater maritime
vulnerability than the North Atlantic SLOCs. Defense of the SLOCs was centrally
important in dimensions unrelated to the Soviets: showing solidarity with NATO
allies—especially the British, whose intelligence leaders shared ONI’s views about
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the threat to the SLOCs—and supporting the Navy position in interservice budget rivalries. A Navy shaped to defend Western SLOCs drew staunch U.S. Army
and Air Force support. And the importance of “getting the troops to Europe”
hardly faced critical doubt on the Hill.42 So, for Navy planners the idea of an
anti-SLOC Soviet navy was a perennial winner, one not to be relinquished lightly,
and indeed to be defended—however unsupportable that defense might become.
A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? SLOC DEFENSE—
WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
What difference did a misunderstood enemy make for force-employment plans
and for planning the future force structure? American operational planners were
planning to employ forces to defend the SLOCs; their defensive script paralleled
that of their Soviet opposites, resulting in centers of gravity the mutually defensive warring forces foresaw for themselves that were nearly 1,500 miles apart, as
shown in the figure.
Whatever its overall shape, a Third World War seemed highly unlikely to
involve a Battle of the Atlantic III.43 Until the Maritime Strategy emerged in the
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC III?

The gray diagonals, right, show where Soviet bastion/homeland-defense forces were expected to concentrate; the light gray area indicates where Soviet
screening forces would seek to deny entry to NATO surface forces. NATO SLOC-defense forces could be expected to concentrate below the GIUK gap
as shown by the diagonals on the left.
Source: Adapted from NIE 11-15-82D, p. 17.
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mid-1980s, the two great navies might not even have been “ships that pass in the
night.” Employment plans for the U.S. Second Fleet, intended to counter Soviet
submarines flooding south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow. They were essentially pointless, except for possible use in dealing with Soviet “spoilers” sent
into the Atlantic on a one-way mission to tie up larger American forces on the
defense.44
Force-structure plans, which aimed at countering an anti-SLOC Soviet navy at
the time and into the future, are more complicated to assess. This is because the
aircraft carriers, while immensely potent, played little role in SLOC defense (or
strategic ASW).45 And the rest of the Navy’s platforms and systems were inherently multipurpose. ASW and air-defense capabilities developed for one combat
scenario could perform well in others. Nonetheless, particular investments in
ships or other systems optimized for convoy defense against massed submarine
and air attack well may have been misdirected effort. A prominent candidate in
this regard was the fifty-ship FFG-7, Perry-class frigate program. Billions of dollars invested in it might have been spent better on forces optimized for carrier
screening, countermine warfare, or other missions, such as attacking the bastions
or striking ashore.
Some might argue that, despite these errors, U.S. defense efforts nonetheless deterred the Soviets from attacking the SLOCs. Such a view does not seem
logical. There should be little ground for taking satisfaction in deterring an antiSLOC “threat” that was essentially abstract. The actual Soviet navy that existed
during the Cold War had not seriously contemplated attacking the SLOCs; had
not bought forces for that mission; did not train or exercise to carry it out; and
was not up to the task, in the highly unlikely event that it tried to accomplish it.
A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? STRATEGIC ASW—
WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
In the case of strategic ASW, how history will view the consequences of the
lengthy delay between the Soviets’ adoption of the bastions and the U.S. Navy’s
development of plans to attack them will depend mainly on whether strategic
ASW is seen as a bad idea or a good one. For those in the MAD camp or those
who simply thought the prospects for success in an antibastion campaign were
close to nil, the delay was an accidental blessing for the nation. From this point
of view, the lengthy interval was a period during which the nation luckily avoided
planning to do something that could have led to catastrophe.
For others, the delay in developing plans to threaten the bastions was a great
strategic opportunity forgone. Consider assessments from two officials deeply
involved in the decisions of the time. Former Director of Naval Intelligence
(DNI) Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro said that the Maritime Strategy “had a lot
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to do with helping end the Cold War.”46 Former Navy Secretary John F. Lehman
has gone further, crediting the Navy with a major role not just in “ending” but in
“winning” the Cold War.47 From this point of view, the nation surely would have
been served better if the bastion defense / strategic reserve had been recognized
for what it was soon after it appeared in 1973. The Maritime Strategy—with its
anti-SSBN component—then might have been developed in the mid-1970s; that
is, under the leadership of Admirals Elmo R. Zumwalt and James L. Holloway
(CNOs 1970–74 and 1974–78, respectively), to be perfected under Hayward and
Watkins.
This historical section must conclude with an important question, at best
partly answered: If bad decisions were made (SLOC defense) and good/bad ones
delayed (strategic ASW), did it really make a decisive difference in the history
of the era? After all, the powerful, multipurpose Navy acquired during the Cold
War did underwrite the nation’s alliances and successfully countered (this author
believes defeated) the Soviet navy’s unprecedented attempt, in the early 1970s, to
carry out a peacetime political mission “to protect the state interests of the USSR
on the seas and oceans.”48 But success in a peacetime political mission says little
about likely success in the number one task: achieving victory had there been
war. And it says nothing at all about the uneven quality of the processes through
which the Cold War Navy was brought into being.
LESSONS FOR TODAY
Our attention now turns to planning for today and for the future, drawing on
the history just reviewed.49 The article will look, first, at what Cold War history
may mean for SLOC defense, and then for strategic ASW.50 It will suggest specific ways in which repetition of the strategic errors of the Cold War might be
avoided, and offer concluding thoughts about the broader meaning of what has
been examined.
SLOC Defense Today
Today’s planning for the wartime security of lines of communication in the
North Atlantic shows a strong continuity with that of the Cold War, expressed
in historical metaphor redolent of that continuity. The mission statement of the
new NATO Joint Force Command in Norfolk includes that the command will
“help protect sea lines of communication between North America and Europe,
in a ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.’”51 Recent comments by senior Navy officials
have made clear that, if there should be a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” it will
be fought against the Russian navy, which obviously would have to come out to
fight it.52
Unfortunately, this line of argument comes dangerously close to echoing the
errors of the Cold War. The Soviet navy never was coming out to fight, and the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/6
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smaller, less capable Russian navy is even less likely to do so.53 One presumes
that the aim of stating, nonetheless, the existence of a possible, even likely,
concrete Russian threat to the SLOCs reflects non-threat-related objectives: to
promote alliance solidarity and build political and public support in the United
States for needed Navy programs. These objectives remain as legitimate as they
were during the Cold War. However, seeking to promote them by deviating
from reality-based planning is unlikely to be effective. First, public support may
be difficult to sustain in the face of criticism that the Navy is distorting reality
on behalf of the service’s self-interests.54 Second, the time-honored principle
that the planner above all must defend his own vulnerabilities provides fully
sufficient grounds for acquiring needed forces and exercising them to maintain
their readiness.55 The greatest American vulnerability at sea continues to be
control of the North Atlantic (with regard to SLOCs, undersea cables, and possible future strategic conventional or nuclear threats to the continental United
States). Moreover, that control remains an essential condition for the integrity
of the alliance.
Most importantly, the emerging strategic situation provides an alternative, offensive strategic use for forces that complements and promotes traditional SLOC
defense. The rapid globalization of the world economy has made Russia far more
dependent on the sea than in the past for the growth of its economy, in keeping
with its aspirations as a great power.56 This suggests that the United States and
its allies should adopt a blockade strategy in response. Neither Russia nor any
other nation can use the surface of the world ocean except at the sufferance of
the United States and its allies.57 In this sense, the West can be said to enjoy global
command of the sea.
In the case of Russia, its assets at sea are mainly economic in nature: those
engaged in cabotage, international hauling, general commerce for the merchant
fleet (the second largest in the world, after the Chinese), and liquefied natural
gas (LNG) and grain exports; a large fishing fleet; and scientific-research ships
and the like.58 The potential vulnerability of these assets should be exploited—for
deterrence; for crisis response; or, if war is unavoidable, to fight and terminate
it successfully. Let us examine briefly two examples of a blockade strategy in action—recognizing that blockade is likely to be more effective in “small war” situations, where the political stakes and the scale of military operations are limited.
First, in peacetime, to buttress deterrence, the West would make clear that
Russian aggression against a NATO ally will be met with blockade at sea as well
as with ground and air forces ashore.59 Specifically, whatever the form or timing
of NATO’s response on land, the United States and its allies immediately would
deny Russia the use of the world ocean.60 Russia would face a choice between, on
the one hand, seeking or holding on to territorial or political gains on its western
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periphery and, on the other hand, forgoing the payoff from the vast investments
it has made in LNG exports. Second, during a crisis, these sea-denial measures
might be implemented gradually. It may be possible to calibrate these measures
to correspond to the intensity
of Russian threats, including
Employment plans for the U.S. Second Fleet,
intended to counter Soviet submarines flood- ambiguous threats of “hybrid
ing south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow. warfare,” in both its nowfamiliar forms and some perThey were essentially pointless.
haps still to be seen. Through
marking, shadowing, and the like—without firing a shot—the United States and
its allies could pose a tangible threat to Russian assets at sea, wherever found.61
The blockade concept would seem to deserve careful examination as the Navy
continues to develop plans for the new era. The idea likely has an even richer
potential against China, which already is heavily dependent on seaborne imports
of energy, raw materials, and even foodstuffs.62 Navy planning for Second Fleet’s
AOR obviously must be integrated globally across all AORs. The Maritime Strategy of the mid-1980s might be seen as an exemplar with respect to planning on a
global scale across all phases of conflict, from peace to war termination and into
the postwar world.63 Whatever form a twenty-first-century maritime strategy
may take, it likely should include a blockade component, on behalf of SLOC defense and to exploit its larger potential.
Strategic ASW Today
Strategic ASW is also an obvious candidate methodology for exploiting Western
sea power today, as it was during the Cold War. This is not merely an abstract
possibility; the Navy recently let it be known that it contemplates using its submarine force to “deny the bastions”: that is, to attack Russian SSBNs.64 (While it
would seem reasonable to presume that the stated intention reflects the existence
of an operational capability to execute it, no such capability was stated specifically, nor do the remarks that follow here so presume.)
Strategic ASW is a complex subject deserving more extensive exposition than
space allows.65 But it can be said without qualification that executing the strategic
ASW mission today would be one of those rare cases in which failure would be
far better than success. First, success almost certainly would trigger the firing of
Russian nuclear ASW weapons—to which the United States lacks the capability
to respond in kind at sea, and in response to which it would have no incentive to
escalate ashore. Second, it likely would result in nuclear ecological consequences
of unknown but possibly catastrophic scale. Third—and of the highest possible
importance—the mortal intercontinental nuclear threat to which successful strategic ASW would subject the nation would be suffered on behalf of no clear or
feasible strategic objective.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/6

14

Dismukes:
The
Competition—Cold War Lessons about Stra
46
NAVA L WA
R CReturn
O L L E G E of
R EGreat-Power
VIEW

The logic of strategic ASW during the Cold War cannot be applied to the new
strategic situation against Russia. The United States should avoid threatening
Russian SSBNs in almost all conceivable circumstances. As it did during the Cold
War, the Navy should take the lead in framing strategy regarding the adversary’s
SSBNs—paradoxically, no longer to maximize, but today to minimize, the threat
that U.S. forces may pose. The Navy should seek explicit national-commandauthority approval for the appropriate policy.66 The United States should adjust
its declaratory policy, its military-to-military diplomacy, and the Navy’s own
operational behavior accordingly.
In this last respect, Navy developmental and training exercises in the Arctic,
such as the ICEX series, should be reviewed carefully. Their roots lie deep in the
Cold War. Propelled mainly by the momentum of technical development, operational routine, and an established bureaucratic structure, they seem to have been
continued since the end of the Cold War without conscious attention to their
strategic effects. But in fact they convey a strong strategic message in the language
of action: the only possible targets that exist for U.S. under-ice torpedoes today
are Russian submarines, obviously including SSBNs.67 Faced with this reality,
Russian planners are likely to prove hard to convince that the United States intends to give their SSBNs a wide berth.68
Avoiding Yesterday’s Mistakes
It would seem logical to base measures aimed at avoiding yesterday’s mistakes on
a deep understanding of why those mistakes were made. The author has found
no satisfactory single explanation, and not one that suggests effective corrective
measures. Not surprisingly, an intelligence-planning mistake that persisted for
over forty years had many complicated, interacting causes.69 These must be left
to others to explore and prioritize.
What does seem certain is that internal Navy self-corrective processes were
absent or did not kick in with sufficient force. This article will suggest three
specific process-oriented measures that may hold promise for minimizing the
chance that today’s planning repeats the Cold War–era mistakes. They are advanced in a most tentative manner because of the radical differences between the
Cold War’s binary simplicities and today’s multipolar mix of state and nonstate
actors, in a milieu of the most rapidly accelerating technological change humankind has ever experienced. Let us look first at intelligence, then planning, and
finally the nexus between the two.
Intelligence. Homespun wisdom long has held that it’s not what you don’t know
that gets you into trouble; it’s what you’re surest of. Despite its humble origins,
this maxim suggests a key self-corrective measure: intelligence professionals and
their consumers should be most skeptical of the conclusions about adversaries
that the IC holds with the highest confidence and for the longest time. The Cold
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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War experience suggests that a certain bureaucratic inertia attaches to intelligence conclusions at the strategic level. On the intelligence side, analysts and
the organizations they serve become associated with a particular reading of an
adversary’s intentions, and so are inclined to resist accepting alternatives. During
the Cold War this tendency hampered, even prevented, an unblinkered search for
what the adversary actually intended. Intelligence analysts (and their consumers)
must remain open to the possibility that the adversary may contemplate novel
employment concepts, based on alien strategic priorities.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish internal procedures within
the IC to critically review and question its own “official truth.” During the Cold
War Richard K. Betts showed how extraordinarily difficult it was to arrive at valid
estimates in the first place.70 Independent assessment by outside groups is likely
to remain the best means to confirm whether the IC’s depiction of the adversary
is valid. The work of the most accomplished planner is likely to be useless if it is
based on a spurious understanding of the world.
Planning. That planners always must defend their own vulnerabilities is a truth
that stands without any reference to a potential adversary. There is an important
difference between saying “I have a crucial vulnerability and I will defend it” and
saying “I have a crucial vulnerability, and my adversary intends to attack it.” The
first is always true; the second was not true during the Cold War, nor is it likely
true today. This seems counterintuitive, because attacking the enemy’s biggest
vulnerability is what an American planner would do, and it seemed logical to
expect that the Soviets/Russians would do the same. But the Soviets did not see
it that way, and for the United States that meant years of misdirected effort, and
lost opportunity ensued.
Today, the characterization of adversaries should reflect as closely as possible reality-based planning. It would seem particularly important to avoid letting an abstract vulnerability such as the North Atlantic SLOCs become reified
into a concrete Russian threat—no matter how useful such a public depiction
might be.
The Intel-Planning Nexus. During the Cold War, Navy planners and ONI saw the
same enemy. Planners never had to hedge against Intel’s uncertainties, because,
when it came to the Soviet anti-SLOC mission, there were none. Planners saw the
worst case as the most likely one. Thus the Cold War afforded little experience in the
important business of hedging against Intel’s inevitable uncertainties; nor did the
period after the Cold War, because of its chaotic strategic landscape and the focus
on the amorphous threats that arise when the adversary is defined as “terrorism.”
In the current era, the planning process must be especially cognizant of the
distinction between Intel’s job and that of the planner. The two intersect when
defining the terms of reference for studies of future-force requirements. This—the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/6
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crucial first step in any such study—brings together Intel and planners to define
study objectives, depict the nature of the adversary, and determine which uncertainties are being hedged against, why, and how.71 The enemy being engaged in a
study of future-force needs might turn out to have much the same shape as the
one that is driving today’s force-employment plans—but that conclusion should be
reached only after thoughtful, explicit, and systematic consideration of the matter.
Broader Lessons from the Cold War
The Cold War experience seems to yield two broader messages as well. First,
the Soviet bastion/strategic-reserve missions were a product of technological
innovation: the development of an SSBN carrying missiles of intercontinental
range. It seems quite likely
The work of the most accomplished planner is that the next revolution in
maritime affairs also will arise
likely to be useless if it is based on a spurious
from technological innovaunderstanding of the world.
tion. An obvious candidate in
this regard continues to be nonacoustic detection of submarines, but many other
technological developments are possible. Second, analysis of open sources seems
likely to remain the earliest and best means of insight into an adversary’s strategic
intent. This implies the need to pay the closest possible attention to public statements by Russian (or Chinese) spokesmen about new technology affecting sea
power. Statements regarding purely technological matters deserve top priority,
but statements regarding the practical employment of new technology—so profitably exploited during the Cold War—should not be far behind.
The Maritime Strategy of the mid-1980s showed that the Navy—despite the
errors cataloged in this article—is more than capable of conducting sound, comprehensive planning based on a valid understanding of the adversary and of the
strategic environment. The emerging twenty-first-century version of that strategy
should combine aggressive offense with judicious restraint: offense, to exploit the
West’s global command of the sea through blockade, and so to defend the SLOCs
and gain leverage against a continental adversary; and forbearance regarding the
strategic ASW mission, execution of which would be a colossal mistake.
The Cold War U.S. Navy, like its predecessor in the first half of the twentieth
century, was the most powerful the world had ever seen. It cannot be said with
confidence that, in general over a forty-year period, this came about through effective intelligence or acutely rational strategic planning. Such shortcomings as
were experienced in those areas were overcome through massive material investment, exploitation of technological advantage—and perhaps a measure of good
fortune. Whether in the twenty-first century—in this new era of great-power
competition—the Navy can succeed through reliance on superior investment
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and technology is an open question. The author respectfully submits that morecareful and better-integrated intelligence-planning processes—of the kind that
guided the Maritime Strategy—would improve our chances greatly.

NOTES

		This article is drawn from remarks delivered
at a panel discussion held on 7 November
2017 at the CNA Building, Arlington, Virginia. While the views expressed are solely
those of the author, they are indebted to the
work of his Cold War colleagues James M.
McConnell and Robert G. Weinland and, for
contemporary advice and encouragement, to
Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), Bruce F.
Powers, and Thomas E. Anger.
1. James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary
Mattis on the National Defense Strategy”
(speech delivered at the School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univ.,
Washington, DC, 19 January 2018), available
at dod.defense.gov/. The transcript uses initial
uppercase for “Great Power.” Mr. Mattis was
announcing the recent release of the National
Defense Strategy, the summary of which uses
the less-specific term interstate competition.
U.S. Defense Dept., Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s
Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: 2018), p.
1, available at www.defense.gov/.
2. Injudiciously pursued preparations for major
war can make such a war more likely; it is
recognized widely that this was the case with
World War I. Of the considerable body of literature on this subject, see Paul M. Kennedy,
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism,
1860–1914 (New York: Humanity Books,
1988), and more recently, Christopher Clark,
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in
1914 (New York: HarperCollins, 2013).
3. This possibility scarcely can be ruled out,
given the absence of deep ideological competition or territorial disputes whose resolution the parties regard as vital. U.S. military
planning henceforth should be oriented to
deal with both a large war—approaching the
scale of the Cold War—and wars of a much
smaller scope. The latter, perhaps in a series
over some years, would put a premium on
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judicious commitment of forces and the fleetin-being concept. The presence of China as
a potential opponent, along with Russia, also
dictates careful attention to the conservation
of forces.
4. Navy Office of Information, “CNO Announces Establishment of U.S. 2nd Fleet,” America’s
Navy, 5 May 2018, www.navy.mil/.
5. A third strategic mission—bringing carrier
tactical aviation (tacair) forward to bear on
the flanks of the war in Europe or on Soviet
territory proper—will not be addressed. This
was an important part of the Navy’s Maritime
Strategy (see note 8) from the U.S. viewpoint. In the author’s opinion, however, the
Soviets saw carrier tacair as considerably less
significant than the threat of strategic ASW.
When the Maritime Strategy is discussed
herein, assessments will be framed mainly
with reference to strategic ASW. Two Russian
writers have offered a different view—that
the Soviets were more concerned with USN
strikes from the sea than with the threat the
Navy posed to their SSBNs. Vladimir Kuzin
and Sergei Chernyavskii, “Russian Reactions
to Reagan’s ‘Maritime Strategy,’” Journal of
Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005), pp.
429–39. But Kuzin and Chernyavskii also say
that Soviet planners gave a high priority to
SLOC interdiction as well—a proposition that
is manifestly untrue. Nonetheless, the possibility that Navy tacair could have destroyed
Soviet SSBNs in port and the logistic and
maintenance infrastructure that supported
them—and thus contributed to the success
of the strategic ASW mission—cannot be
dismissed out of hand. That question, like
the possibility that Navy attacks on the Soviet
flanks might have relieved pressure on NATO
on the central front, simply lies beyond the
boundaries of this investigation.
6. The return of great-power competition, after
a generation of its absence—on top of two
previous generations colored by the unique
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characteristics of World War II and the Cold
War—suggests that strategic thinking also
should return to its primal elements. The
Dutch American scholar Nicholas John Spykman took into account the second Battle of
the Atlantic, still very much in progress at the
time of his writing, to offer counsel on the
shape of the postwar peace. He saw control of
the oceans between the United States and the
“rimlands” of Eurasia as mandatory. Control
of the rimlands might itself give the United
States a dominant position in world politics
and, in any case, would be necessary to contain a single power that might dominate the
continental “heartland.” Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, ed. Helen
R. Nicholl (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944).
Spykman drew heavily on, and also was a
critic of, Sir Halford Mackinder. See Halford
John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction
(New York: Holt, 1919), available at archive
.org/. The power and persistence of this
idea were reconfirmed recently by historian
Robert Kagan. After the Second World War,
Americans were convinced that “their way of
life could not be safe in a world where Europe
and Asia were dominated by hostile autocratic powers.” Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows
Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New
York: Knopf, 2018), p. 124. However unlikely
it may seem today, the United States, at some
future point, could withdraw to a “Fortress
America” protected by two oceanic moats. In
this case, there would be no SLOCs to defend.
Nonetheless, as in the centuries before the
twentieth, American seaborne commerce
might well require protection.
7. The complex responsibilities of the planner,
who must counter the threat that intelligence
identifies, defend his own vulnerabilities,
and also cope with non-threat-related
concerns, such as the Navy’s position in the
never-ending Defense Department budget
battle, will be addressed several times in the
narrative below. The term planner as used
here refers to Navy officers carrying that
designation and special study groups and
others assigned planning functions. Planners
rarely are anything other than unrestricted
line officers, supported by long-serving Navy
civilians, and are always the leaders in multidisciplinary groups. In the Navy hierarchy,
the CNO is the chief Navy planner. This
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experience during the Cold War—with apologies to any in more recent times who may
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10. This article occasionally will use “Intel” as an
alternative way to refer to ONI.
11. This is such an important discriminant, so
let us look at a place—northern Norway—
where uncertainty prevailed then, as it may
well today. If the Soviets had intended an
anti-SLOC campaign, they obviously also
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its defensive forces to bear as far forward
as possible: air defense against antiship
missile–armed, long-range aircraft and,
more importantly, ASW forces against Soviet
submarines making the 1,200-mile transit to
and from the presumed North Atlantic battle
zone. But how might the Soviets go about
seizing and occupying a sizable part of Norway? Would they violate Finnish or Swedish
neutrality? While the IC pronounced its early
assessment with apparent confidence (i.e.,
no Soviet initial plans for operations south of
Finnmark), even its views evolved over time.
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For many others, Soviet strategic intentions
on the Northern Flank remained a matter of
deep uncertainty throughout the Cold War.
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showed an evolving view of Soviet intentions.
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Sweden. Central Intelligence Agency, Warsaw
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potentially strong NATO resistance.” Central
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28–29, FOIA Collection, Central Intelligence
Agency, Washington, DC, available at www
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Collection, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, available at www.cia.gov/.
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Air War College Research Report (defense
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and War, RAND Report R-3725-RC (Santa
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12. This insight was provided by Norman Polmar.
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this article: When did the Soviets decide
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never intended to attack the SLOCs. Norman
Polmar, “Why 2000 or Even 400 Submarines,”
Naval Submarine League Review (June 2018),
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evidence that U.S. intelligence officials from
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to ex–World War II German specialists on the
Soviet navy to understand Soviet purposes. It
is not known how influential German views
became, but it is hard to imagine a more
biased departure point for the first generation
of ONI’s Soviet analysts. The Germans had
just had experience not only with their nearly
successful offense against the North Atlantic
SLOCs but also with the defense of their
own Black Sea SLOCs against Soviet attack.
For them, SLOCs were what modern naval
warfare was about. See also Norman Polmar,
“To Understand Russian Submarines, Think
outside the Box,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 145/10/1,400 (October 2019).
13. Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Attack Submarine Force and Western Sea Lines
of Communication, SR 79-10038 (National
Foreign Assessment Center, 1 April 1979),
doc. no. 0005499486, 1 April 1979, CIA
Analysis of the Soviet Navy, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC [hereafter
CIA Analysis], available at www.cia.gov/.
14. “Comments on Navy Review of Revised
OSR SLOC Paper,” memorandum, doc. no.
0005533608, 25 January 1979, CIA Analysis;
“Soviet Fleet Logistics: Capabilities and Limitations,” doc. no. 0005532898, 1 August 1976,
CIA Analysis.
15. There should have been no uncertainty about
this point. The Soviet navy simply never
practiced performance of the top mission the
U.S. Navy ascribed to it. The Soviets’ largestever exercise, the global-scale OKEAN in
1975, did involve simulated attacks on small
numbers of Soviet merchant ships, which
some construed to be an anti-SLOC scenario.
Watson and Walton, both serving intelligence
officers, limited their interpretation of those
maneuvers to the Soviets “seemingly” attacking SLOCs. B. W. Watson [Lt. Cdr., USN] and
M. A. Walton [Lt. Cdr., USN], “Okean-75,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 102/7/881
(July 1976). The CIA saw the merchant ships
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Changing Soviet Navy (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1973). Herrick was a
USN intelligence officer. His book was drawn
from research begun at Columbia University’s
School of Russian Studies. The publisher inserted a “Publisher’s Preface” (pp. xi–xii) that
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DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public
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Navy Strategic Vision in 2019,” Naval War
College Review 72, no. 2 (Spring 2019), pp.
129–65. Till notes that both the attacking and
defense of merchant shipping have disappeared from the planning of most other
nations as well. Till, Seapower, p. 245.
57. This characterization is based on a broad
reading of relative capabilities. To the author, the advantage in numbers and quality
of the West’s globally mobile forces versus
those of Russia (or China) seems evident
today and likely to grow as U.S. building
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Security,” Woodrow Wilson International
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head for policy and posture in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (Op 515B).
The forum was streamed in real time, and
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Press, 2019), p. 201. The book’s contents—including the reference to strategic ASW—were
quoted extensively in subsequent online
commentary by Adm. James G. Foggo, USN,
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US Naval Strategy [blog], 6 February 2020,
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further analysis. For a creative example in this
regard, see Vince Manzo, Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options after
New START, IRM2019-U-019494 (Arlington,
VA: CNA, March 2019).

65. For a brief assessment of the mission today,
see the author’s “Strategic ASW in 2020—a
Stunningly Bad Idea,” Clio’s Musings: History
and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), 17
February 2020, cliosmusings.blog/.

69. Polmar, “Why 2000 or Even 400 Submarines,”
provides a plausible listing. More recently, see
Brian Hayes [Lt., USNR], “Naval Intelligence,
the CIA, and the Soviet-Russian Threat: The
Cold War and Beyond,” U.S. Naval Institute
(blog), 5 July 2019, blog.usni.org/. Hayes adds
explanations at the psychological level of human perception.

66. As observed in note 41, during the Cold
War it was not clear whether or how this was
done. It does not seem desirable that decisions regarding a matter of this gravity to the
nation should be made by one of the military
services.
67. Official explanations of the need for such
exercises include quite plausible strategic
objectives, such as protecting shipping lanes
(seldom absent, as has been seen, when the
Navy speaks of its strategic purposes) and
the American exclusive economic zone in the
Arctic. ASW, the mission of greatest interest
to the Russians, is not mentioned. “ICEX
2018 Briefing Book,” 8 March 2018, pp. 1–12,
available at navylive.dodlive.mil/.
68. The inventory of sixty-plus of the world’s
quietest nuclear attack submarines (SSNs)
comprises a fleet in being that seems guaranteed to keep the Russian navy in a defensive
posture, whether or not U.S. SSNs execute
the strategic ASW mission. (For elaboration
on the possible contemporary meanings of a
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70. Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978),
pp. 61–89. According to Betts (e-mail to author, 14 September 2019), the definitive treatment is his Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge
and Power in National Security (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 2007), chap. 2.
71. Although this process has occurred countless
times in the past and remains a staple of
planning today, to the author’s knowledge
little attention appears to have gone into
systematizing it. It might be useful to survey,
say, a dozen senior directors of recent forcestructure studies to learn what commonalities and differences have marked the way in
which study terms of reference have handled
hedging at the intelligence-planning nexus.
During the Cold War, as noted, this problem
never arose—for the worst reasons.
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